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Daniel Freed
Norval Morris became a hero of mine when I read The
Future of Imprisonment as a student of James Vorenberg
and Alan Dershowitz at Harvard Law School in the 1970s.
Dan Freed is a more recent hero—for only a quarter cen-
tury. It is an honor to begin to recount his work and legacy.
There is a personal side to this task, and I ask your
indulgence to begin with the day I first met Dan Freed.
This was in late 1984, shortly before I joined the faculty at
Yale. Introducing himself in the Law School Dining Hall,
Dan asked if I had an interest in the law of criminal sen-
tencing. I think I said (and I know I thought): “Sentencing?
In law school? There’s not much law there.” On my first
day of school, so to speak, I knew of Dan Freed primarily
as the progenitor of bail reform. I did not know that he
had been teaching a full course on sentencing since 1980.
While Dan had been developing and teaching his
course on sentencing, I had been a federal prosecutor. As I
told Dan in that first conversation, the truth is that federal
prosecutors in those days had very little to do with sen-
tencing. Indeed, I had never recommended a sentence to a
judge, not even to the occasional judge who asked my
views. The policy of the United States Attorney’s Office for
the Southern District of New York was that (excepting the
exceptional case, of course) our only role in sentencing
was to tell the probation officer and the court what we
knew about the crime and the defendant, including any
cooperation he had provided. The closest to sentencing
advocacy I came was to urge, on a few occasions, that the
defense counsel’s plea for mercy had downplayed the seri-
ousness of the offense. But the sentencing function itself
belonged entirely to the judge.
Dan replied, “Yes, but you know all of that is about to
change.” He referred to Marvin Frankel’s book,1 to the
Sentencing Reform Act2 that President Reagan had just
signed, and to the new agency that would be writing
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
I knew about the book and about the new legislation,
and I did not hide my skepticism. I told Dan that I had
been practicing before the very bench that Judge Frankel
castigated. The judges portrayed in the book were for the
most part very different from those I saw. I witnessed
judges who seemed to take the responsibility of sentenc-
ing quite seriously and who often explained at length their
reasons for the sentence they were imposing. I was dubi-
ous about the Sentencing Reform Act, as well. I remarked
that the legislation appeared to be decidedly ambiguous on
the central issue: whether the Guidelines would be bind-
ing on judges or would just be recommendations, of no
more inherent persuasive power than a defense attorney’s
plea for mercy or the prosecutor’s rejoinder. 
Dan’s eyes twinkled. It was clear he loved to talk about
sentencing guidelines! He explained to me that how bind-
ing the Federal Guidelines would be was one of the
fascinating issues still to be addressed by the soon-to-be-
appointed U.S. Sentencing Commission. Dan parried my
questions with deeper ones of his own. At one point he
caught my gaze straight-on and asked, “Why should a per-
son’s sentence depend on the luck of the draw—which
judge he happens to appear before?” I thought, “How
wonderfully idealistic this man is!” I replied, though, that
the criminal justice system is full of contingencies—good
luck and bad luck. It’s bad luck to get caught; it’s good luck
to be appointed a skilled public defender. It’s bad luck to
have no one to cooperate against; it’s usually good luck to
have a prosecutor with a heavy docket. It’s bad luck to get a
law-and-order jury; it’s good luck to get your presentence
report written by a probation officer who looks into non-
imprisonment options. Ultimately, you can have good luck
or bad luck in the judge to whom your case is assigned. In
the general scheme of things, isn’t it better for defendants
to be sentenced by human beings who can exercise judg-
ment, rather than according to a set of guidelines written
for everyone else?
That, said Dan, with growing excitement in his voice, is
the challenge. Can we, without denying the important role
of judges and advocates and probation officers, devise a
system in which we at least try to make sure the same
rules are applied to everyone? We try to do that in trials,
don’t we? “Doesn’t it seem strange to you, Kate, that in
sentencing we’ve never even tried to apply to same rules to
everyone?” Indeed, it did seem odd. I was hooked. This was
the beginning of a long conversation, with Dan and with
so many across the nation and around the world. I thank
him for insisting that I join in.
In hooking me, Dan was doing what he had done
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J. Pottenger, Dennis Curtis, Michael Smith, Jonathan
Silbert, Ken Mann, Peter Goldberger, William Genego,
Vicki Jackson, Pierce O’Donnell, Michael Churgin, Chris
Stone, Miriam Berkman, Ron Weich. Over the ensuing
quarter century, so many more students, now colleagues
around the country, would be “hooked” by Dan Freed on
making part of their life’s work the reform of sentencing
and other aspects of the criminal justice system.
Dan began his academic study of criminal punishment
in the federal system in the early 1970s, shortly after Judge
Frankel sent him the page proofs for Criminal Sentences:
Law without Order. By 1974, Dan had convened a working
group on federal sentencing. Participating in the group, in
addition to Yale professors Freed and Curtis, were Judge
Frankel; Judge Jon O. Newman, then a district judge in
Connecticut; Ron Gainer, a senior career prosecutor at
Main Justice; and U.S. Parole Commission Chairman
Maurice Stigler. Out of that special working group came a
Yale Law Journal symposium issue on federal parole3 and
then the 1977 book Toward a Just and Effective Sentencing
System.4 This volume, coauthored by Professor Curtis
among others, contained draft sentencing reform legisla-
tion that became the precursor to the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, first introduced by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy the same year.5
Dan has continued to study and critique the federal
sentencing system ever since. He was an important
adviser to Professor Stanton Wheeler’s study of white-
collar sentencing in the pre-Guidelines era. Unfortunately,
Wheeler’s book6 was not published until 1988, after the
Federal Guidelines were already near final draft. Also in
1988, Dan and young professor Marc Miller launched the
Federal Sentencing Reporter, which is still going strong at
age twenty. The Yale Law Journal published Dan’s impor-
tant article, “Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers,” in 1992.7 When I and others in this field have
written about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Dan has
been our best reader and critic. 
Of special significance, Dan’s classes at Yale through-
out the 1980s and 1990s included terrific sentencing
workshops that helped students understand both the fed-
eral system and state sentencing systems. I recently asked
Dan what he thought his biggest contribution was at Yale.
He answered without a beat—“the sentencing work-
shops,” but only, he added, because “the other participants
were so marvelous.”
As I’ve suggested, most of my work with Dan has
involved the federal side, and in particular the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. But it is Dan’s workshops on criminal sen-
tencing in the states that I want to describe in the rest of
my remarks.
In the spring of 1984, Dan and Professor Jay Pottenger
invited two experienced state sentencing judges to talk in
the Yale faculty lounge to interested students and others
about their sentencing processes, theories, and practices.
He was amazed at how these two judges, both highly
respected, were so different in their approach to sentenc-
ing. After the talk in the faculty lounge, Dan and Jay
decided to create a new type of sentencing class at Yale: a
workshop on sentencing in which students would learn
from actual sentencing judges. I have obtained from the
registrar of the law school the course listing of that first
workshop: “Sentencing Principles and Profiles: To be
taught all day Friday and one-half day on Saturday.”
Whether they realized it or not, Dan and Jay (with the
support of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation) were
beginning what would become for Dan a decades-long
experiment or series of experiments in teaching, learning,
and transmitting information about the real world of crim-
inal sentencing. Dan has referred to these workshops as a
long “adventure” that put him in contact with “wonderful
places and people” he otherwise would never have known.
In discussing his workshops, Dan strikes a positive note of
wondrous appreciation of the human capacity to reason, a
trait that is so much part of his character and his own
work and that is at the core of his own proposals for sen-
tencing reform.
In Dan’s first sentencing workshop, in 1985, the judges
all came from Alabama. Dan had scouted out Alabama the
summer before, with the help of a Yale Law graduate on
the bench there. He was careful to invite judges who were
well thought of within their districts but had different rep-
utations as sentencers—lenient, tough, and even
unpredictable. Dan speaks about these Alabama judges
with such affection and respect, even all these years later.
He told me last month, with a touch of paternal pride, that
one of the judges he met in Alabama had recently become
chief justice of the state.
In later years, he invited judges from other jurisdictions—
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Connecticut. But each of Dan’s state
sentencing workshops stuck to one state so that all the
judges were operating under the same formal law. Every
judge had to provide Dan in advance with redacted copies of
real presentence reports and had to agree to travel to New
Haven for four separate two-day workshops. In the first year
of the seminar, only the judges were assigned to give a sen-
tence in each of the cases; the students were observers and
interlocutors and critics. Later, at the suggestion of one of the
participating judges, the students also sentenced every case.
Indeed, the only person who never submitted a sen-
tence was Dan himself. When I later asked him why, he
explained that it was for pedagogical reasons. Dan would
ultimately be “sentencing” each of the students when he
gave them a grade for the course and wanted to remain to
their eyes an unbiased evaluator of their sentences and
explanations; nor did he want to suggest that there was a
single “right” sentence in any case.
The range of workshop sentences in nearly every case
was broad. Moreover, the reasons given by the sentencers
also varied greatly—both reasons sounding in the particular
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facts of the case and reasons sounding in the relevant
principles of criminal law or justifications for punish-
ment. A case that one judge might initially see as crying
out for a rehabilitative sentence might be seen by another
judge as necessitating a sentence of imprisonment to
reflect the seriousness of the crime. By the ground rules of
the workshop, the initial sentences and initial reasons or
explanations were only the beginning of the conversation.
Every judge and every student had to agree to be open to
questions and to reconsideration of sentence if warranted.
Whereas judges are usually the ones doing the question-
ing, the judges in Dan’s workshops were often on the
receiving end of questions from the students: “But, Judge,
how can you just ignore the effect on his family?” or
“Judge, you’re effectively nullifying the criminal law if you
give probation here.” The judges in Dan’s class appeared
open to hearing contrary views, and, like the students,
often ended up seeing the case differently after the class
discussion than they had in their initial sentence and
statement of reasons. As Dan said to me earlier this year,
in recollections about the workshops: 
The judges were marvelous. We saw such sincere,
thoughtful, hardworking judges, who had an astound-
ing array of different practices and approaches. What
we witnessed in those workshops in the mid-1980s
made clear that any move to sentencing rules would
be difficult.
It was also critical to the success of Dan’s workshops
that they reached beyond the classroom. During the inten-
sive days in New Haven, there were opportunities for the
students and judges to share meals and walks around Yale.
Best of all, there was a long, delicious, and intellectually
exciting dinner at Dan’s and Judy’s home, usually on the
night before the workshop began. Some years, students
were also assigned to do a profile of the judges; some even
traveled to the judge’s home court to watch her conduct
real sentencings. The Alabama judges invited their Yale
student friends down to a state judicial conference, where
the students were warmly received. 
As I’ve said, the sentences were disparate, sometimes
quite so. Hence here is “Freed Sentencing Workshop Find-
ing #1”: There Is Disparity in Sentencing.
But one of the most important observations made by
Dan and his students was that virtually every sentence of
every judge in every workshop was reasoned. These were
thoughtful and experienced judges, and they could and did
explain their sentences, and they could and did reason and
explain further in response to inquiries. Hence there is
“Freed Sentencing Workshop Finding #2”: Criminal Sen-
tences Are (or Can Be) the Product of Reasoning. 
Perhaps the notion that judges are simply arbitrarily
imposing sentences, and the related notion that the sen-
tence depends on what the judge ate for breakfast, gained
credence because too many judges were not putting on the
proverbial record the reasons for their sentences. 
Putting these two findings together, I infer that dispar-
ity does not necessarily reflect arbitrariness or
unreasonableness by the particular sentencing authority. I
also infer that simply requiring a clear statement of rea-
sons will not necessarily eliminate, or even reduce,
disparity. 
These observations bring us to the heart of the issue
that everyone who cares about sentencing has stayed up
pondering late into the night: Is it possible to reduce inter-
judge disparity while still ensuring that the sentence in a
particular case is the product of reason? 
I do not know whether, when he began his workshops,
Dan consciously set out to answer this question. But I
think his workshops do suggest an answer. While the
judges did not ever reach full consensus on sentences,
almost all of them were moved after listening to others.
Dan and his students observed and documented the evolu-
tion of their thinking about the purposes of sentencing
and how to achieve these purposes—evolution that, as a
general rule, drew them closer together. Often, though not
always, this meant regression toward the mean. (I would
be interested whether empirical studies of the brief experi-
ment with “sentencing panels” in the federal courts in the
early 1970s reveal a similar pattern.)
On the basis of Dan’s workshops, I thus have a hypoth-
esis: a jurisdiction can develop a set of sentencing
guidelines that will be regarded by sentencing judges as
legitimate, workable, and reasonable. But this will be
achieved not by a top-down process, starting with a grand
theory of punishment (or a grand mishmash of theories)
and implementing these principles down to the last iota.
Rather, workable and respected guidelines will be devel-
oped by gathering together people who have good faith,
common sense, and sentencing experience. Once the peo-
ple are gathered, there must be some pedagogy (in Dan’s
workshops, it was by sentencing real cases on the basis of
presentence reports) whereby each participant explains
and gives reasons for her approach, and, equally impor-
tantly, listens to what everyone else has to say. 
Most importantly, the ground rules have to make clear
that each person is free to change his mind about matters
small and large, and no one is there to represent vested
interests. Dan’s workshops showed—showed me, any-
way—that in such a setting, through hard work over many
months, it is just conceivable that a broad consensus on
the content of sentencing guidelines may be achieved. 
I have only begun to scratch the surface of what I know
and think about Dan Freed. Let me end by saying that I
was only partly right when I early on judged Dan to be an
idealist. In fact, this man is that remarkable combination
that seems to defy the laws of both logic and politics: he is
both an idealist and a realist. He has never stopped pursu-
ing a better world—not just a better theory, but a better
world on the ground. And he has enlisted so many others
to join with him. 
Thank you, Dan. 
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